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ABSTRACT
With the rising interest of expedient, safe, and high-efficient
transportation, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have
turned into a critical technology in smart transportation sys-
tems. Because of the high mobility of nodes, VANETs are
vulnerable to security attacks. In this paper, we propose
a novel framework of software-defined VANETs with trust
management. Specifically, we separate the forwarding plane
in VANETs from the control plane, which is responsible for
the control functionality, such as routing protocols and trust
management in VANETs. Using the on-demand distance
vector routing (TAODV) protocol as an example, we present
a routing protocol named software-defined trust based ad
hoc on-demand distance vector routing (SD-TAODV). Sim-
ulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of
the proposed software-defined VANETs with trust manage-
ment.
Keywords
Vehicular ad hoc networks; software-defined networking; se-
curity; trust management
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, with the miniaturization of mobile end de-
vices, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) become popular
in a wide range of fields. For example, they can be used
in military, catastrophes, expedition and so on. A vehicu-
lar ad hoc network (VANET) is a type of MANETs in the
vehicular environment. With the rising demand of conve-
nient, safe, and efficient transportation, VANETs act as an
vital role in intelligent transportation systems [1–4]. Vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) are two
main communication ways in VANETs. MANET routing
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protocols, such as ad hoc on-demand distance vector rout-
ing (AODV), can also be used in VANETs.
Quality of service (QoS) and security issues are two main
challenges in wireless mobile networks [5–21]. Particularly,
network topologies of VANETs always change due to the
high mobility of nodes. Meanwhile, VANETs are easy to
be attacked by DoS, black-hole, and other attacks [22]. So
mitigating these attacks is necessary to improve the security
of VANETs.
Researchers have proposed many security mechanisms in
order to enhance the security of VANETs [23–30]. The au-
thors of [23] propose an distributed cooperative spectrum
sensing scheme, in which the scheme aims to solve the se-
curity issues of CR-VANETs. An trust based framework is
proposed in [24] that provides a second protection to improve
security and maintain privacy of VANETs. Wang et al. [25]
introduce a field game model to solve the security problems
in VANETs. Zheng [26] et al. present a game theoretic ap-
proach to quantitatively analyze the attacking strategies of
ad hoc networks.
Although many researchers have already done some excel-
lent works on trust-based security schemes in VANETs, they
are still hard to ensure safety because most existing security
works couple data forwarding with control (e.g., routing pro-
tocols and trust management). Recently, software-defined
networking (SDN) and virtualization [11,31–36] has become
a emerging technology, which enables researchers to solve
the above problems. Decoupling the control plane from the
forwarding plane is the core idea of SDN, which makes the
forwarding plane directly programmable [37]. Since SDN
separates the control plane from the forwarding plane, the
network nodes only act as efficient forwarding devices [31].
SDN provides a cost-effective networking approach that aims
to reduce the cost of wired and wireless networks and im-
prove the network performance.
In this paper, with the recent advances in SDN, we present
a novel framework of software-defined VANETs with trust
management. Specifically, we separate the forwarding plane
in VANETs from the control plane, which is responsible
for the control functionality, such as routing protocols and
trust management in VANETs. As AODV protocol [38] is
frequently used in VANETs, we utilize AODV as an ex-
ample to execute our proposed SDN-based framework in
VANETs. In addition, we move the AODV control logic and
the trust management into the control node. Simulation re-
sults demonstrate that our software-defined trust based on-
demand distance vector routing (SD-TAODV) can improve
the network performance significantly.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: The background
information of AODV protocol and SDN are presented in
Section 2. Section 3 describes our proposed scheme TAODV,
and the combination method of SDN and TAODV is de-
picted in Section 4. Performance of SD-TAODV is evalu-
ated and compared with the traditional AODV in Section 5.
Finally, Some conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. BACKGROUND
VANETs have self-organization features, without relying
on the inherent communication network infrastructures. Mean-
while, VANETs can quickly form networks and build net-
work communications. The MAC and routing protocols are
two important components of VANET protocols. The MAC
protocols include multiple access with collision avoidance
(MACA) [39], carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) and so
on. VANET routing protocols can be divided into two main
groups: topology based routing protocols and geographic
routing protocols [40]. In this section, we use AODV as
an example to introduce the VANET routing protocols. In
addition, we also describe the basic features of SDN and
OpenFlow protocol.
2.1 Overview of AODV Protocol
AODV is one of the most frequently utilized routing pro-
tocols in VANETs [38]. The main difference between AODV
and other VANET routing protocols is that AODV intro-
duces “sequence number” concept, which is utilized to avoid
the count to infinity problem and to prevent rooting loop [41].
Specifically, each node in AODVmust maintain its own rout-
ing table that includes routing information about its neigh-
bor nodes. The operating procedure of AODV can be di-
vided into two main operations: route discovery and route
maintenance [42].
The source node initiates the route discovery process only
if the source needs to forward data packets to a destination,
and the routing table of the source node do not have valid
routes from the source to destination. So the source node
first broadcasts route request (RREQ) packets to its neigh-
bors. There are two different situations when a node receives
a RREQ packet: i) this node sends a route reply (RREP)
if it is the destination or it knows the route(s) to the desti-
nation; ii) the receiving node establishes a reverse route to
the source if the routing table of this node does not have a
routing entry for the destination.
After RREQ packets arrive at the destination, destination
node unicasts a RREP packet to the source node from the
selected reverse path. The route discovery process finishes
when the source node receives the RREP message, and then
data packets begin to be forwarded to the destination by
the source node along the direction of established forwarding
route.
The route maintenance procedure is operated by nodes in
two different ways. One situation is that a node broadcasts
hello messages to its neighbors at regular time intervals so
that the node can maintain connectivity with its neighbors.
Another situation is that the procedure aims to increase the
successful data transmission ratio through the local repair
mechanism [41].
2.2 Overview of Software-defined Networking
Software defined networking is an emerging network archi-
tecture where network control is decoupled from forwarding
plane, and it can be directly programmable [37]. Because
of the decoupling mechanism of the control and forwarding
plane, network nodes only act as forwarding devices. Mean-
while, network control logic is moved into a logic control
layer or a networking operating system [31].
There are many protocol standards on the use of SDN in
real applications. One of the most famous protocol standards
is called OpenFlow [31]. OpenFlow is a widely used protocol
that introduces the SDN concepts to implement in hardware
and software. An prominent characteristic of OpenFlow is
that the existing hardware can be utilized in SDN so as to
design new protocols and to verify their feasibility [31]. Fig-
ure 1 shows the OpenFlow switch and controller.
The information interaction between OpenFlow switches
and controller(s) supports three kinds of messages: controller-
to-switch, asynchronous, and symmetric [43]. The most im-
portant message in control-to-switch is the OFPTFLOW-
MOD [43], which is used to modify the flow table in the
OpenFlow switches. OFPTPACKETIN [43] is the most
important message in asynchronous, and this message en-
ables the OpenFlow switches to send packets to controller
only if the packets can not be processed by the switches.
The most common message of the symmetric is named OF-
PTHELLO [43]. It is used to build a connection between
the OpenFlow switches and controller(s).
3. AODV PROTOCOL WITH TRUST BASED
MECHANISM (TAODV)
In this section, we describe our trust model. We assume
that each node in our TAODV broadcasts packets to its
neighbors periodically, and the neighbors receive the packets
correctly. However, if a node broadcasts multiple packets at
the same time, its neighbors only can receive a part of the
packets because of some unexpected causes (such as heavy
traffic) and malicious attacks (such as black-hole attack).
We use a novel concept forwarding ratio and node trust cal-
culation process [44] to evaluate our node trust value.
3.1 Node Trust Calculation Process
Definition 1(Forwarding ratio): Forwarding ratio is the
number of packets received correctly divided by the number
of packets forwarded. For example, we assume that a node
a sends 120 packets to its neighbor node b, and node b only
receives 100 packets because of the packet loss. Meanwhile,
node b only can forward 80 packets because of its transceiver
capability, so the forwarding ratio of node b to node a is
0.8. The forwarding ratio Rab(t) of node a to node b can be
defined by the following formula
Rab(t) =
Cab(t)
Tab(t)
t ≤W (1)
where Cab(t) represents the number of the packets that a
node can correctly forward to its neighbors. Tab(t) denotes
the total number of packets that the node received before
time t, where W represents the width of the recent time
window.
In TAODV, the packets can be divided into two groups:
control packets (RREQ, RREP and RRER) and data pack-
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Figure 1: OpenFlow switch and controller interac-
tion using OpenFlow protocol.
ets. The control packets (RREQ and RREP) determine the
data transfer path, and forwarding ratio of control packets
is an important factor to determine node trust value. The
node trust computation is shown below
Nab(t) = ω1CRab(t) + ω2DRab(t) (2)
where CRab(t) represents the control packet forwarding ra-
tio and DRab(t) represents the data packet forwarding ra-
tio. Nab(t) denotes the trust value of receiving node b for
forwarding node a. ω1 and ω2 are two weighted factors
(ω1, ω2 ≥ 0, and ω1 + ω2 = 1) that determine which for-
warding ratio (CRab(t) and DRab(t)) is more important in
the node trust calculating process. Particularly, we assume
ω1 = 1 and ω2 = 0, which means the control packet forward-
ing ratio decides the overall node trust value.
3.2 Path Trust Calculation Process
In the route discovery process, when a control packet such
as RREQ arrives at a destination node, the routing path
from source to destination is computed according to the node
trust defined by the section 3.1. According to the axiom [45],
concatenation propagation of trust does not increase trust,
the reverse and forwarding path trust value should not be
more than the trust value of intermediate nodes. Meanwhile,
since the control packet is a crucial factor to determine the
node trust value, we add a new field called PacketTrust (PT)
into the RREQ and RREP packet format and denote by
PTrreq and PTrrep. Specifically, we set the initial value of
PacketTrust to 1. At time t, the trust value of a reverse path
P is denoted by TP (t) and given by the following formula
Tp(t) = Nab(t)× PT
rreq
a (3)
where PT rreqa means the trust value of PacketTrust field in
RREQ packet when a RREQ packet leaves node a.
Tp
′(t) = Nba(t)× PT
rrep
b (4)
where Tp
′(t) denotes the trust value of a forwarding path.
PT
rrep
b means the trust value of PacketTrust field in RREP
packet when a RREP packet leaves node b.
Figure 2: An example of the TAODV calculation
process.
3.3 The Objective Function of TAODV
In our TAODV mechanism, there are two main factors in-
fluencing the whole network performance. One factor is hop
count, and another is path trust value. Our goal is to evalu-
ate the network performance in three different scenarios: the
first one we only consider the path trust factor, the second
one we consider both the hop count factor and path trust
factor, the third one we only consider the hop count factor.
So the objective function of our proposed TAODV protocol
is shown in below:
F (x) = αx1 + βx2 (5)
where F (x) denotes the network performance of VANETs
using TAODV protocol. x1 denotes the path trust value
when control packets arrives at nodes, and x2 denotes the
hop count of control packets. x1 and x2 are two influence
factors that determine the network performance when us-
ing TAODV protocol. α and β (α, β ≥ 0) are two weighted
factors.
From this equation, we make three assumptions that help
us to analyze the TAODV mechanism:
1) When α≫ β, we assume that the network performance
is mainly decided by the path trust value x1.
2) When α ≈ β, we assume that the network performance
is decided by the path trust value x1 and hop count x2.
3) When α≪ β, we assume that the network performance
is decided by the hop count. This scenario is the same as
the original ad-hoc networks using AODV protocol.
3.4 Route Discovery Process of TAODV
The traditional AODV protocol aims to select a minimum
hop count path to transfer the data packets. By contrast, in
our TAODV protocol, we propose a trust based RREQ (T-
RREQ) packet format, which contains the following fields:
(RREQID, HopCount, SourceAddr, SourceSeq, DestAddr,
DestSeq, PacketTrust)
As mentioned before, we design a new field named Packet-
Trust (PT), and add it into a RREQ packet. It is initialized
to 1 and varies during the packet transmission process.
In our TAODV protocol, when a node receives a T-RREQ
packet from its neighbor, first this node checks theRREQID
of this T-RREQ. If the node has already received the same
ID before, this T-RREQ is dropped by this node. On the
contrary, if the RREQID is new, the routing table of the
node checks the sequence number in the RREQ packet, if
the sequence number is fresh, the reverse path is established
by the node and it updates its own routing table in which
calculates the path trust value, if the sequence number is
old, the node discards this RREQ packet. Meanwhile, when
the node receives the T-RREQ message, it checks its routing
table to determine whether this node is destination or have
a fresh route to destination. If so, it updates its routing
table and responds a T-RREP packet back to the source. If
not, the node continues to broadcast this T-RREQ packet
to its neighbors. If the node receives the different T-RREQ
packets simultaneously, the node chooses a best path in the
routing table with better path trust value. In other words,
if the new path trust value is better than the previous one,
the node updates the routing table immediately.
Figure 2 shows an example of reverse path establishment
process of TAODV. We assume that the source node need to
initiate the route discovery process. The source first broad-
casts T-RREQ packets to its neighbor node 1 and node 6.
Meanwhile, the PacketTrust field in the T-RREQ is set to 1.
The T-RREQ packets arrive at node 1 and node 6, the path
trust is calculated in (4.3). The path trust value from source
to node 1 is Ts1 = 0.9× 1 = 0.9. The path trust from source
to node 6 is Ts6 = 0.7 × 1 = 0.7. When node 1 and node 6
receive the T-RREQ packets, the value of PacketTrust field
of the T-RREQ packets changes to 0.9. Node 4 receives two
T-RREQ packets from node 6 and node 1. The routing table
of node 4 compares the path trust value. Here the path trust
T64 = 0.7×0.8 = 0.56 and T14 = 0.9×0.8 = 0.72. So node 4
discards the T-RREQ packet from node 6 because the path
trust value from node 6 to node 1 is smaller than the path
trust value from node 1 to node 4. After the path selection,
node 4 sets up the reverse paths to the source. Similarly,
the final reverse path is from destination, via node 7, node
4, and node 1 to the source.
When receiving a T-RREQ, the destination node replies
T-RREP back to the source node via the intermediate nodes.
Meanwhile, the forwarding paths are established when T-
RREP packets pass through the switch nodes. The format
of a T-RREP packet contains the following fields:
(HopCount, SourceAddr, SourceSeq, DestAddr, DestSeq,
PacketTrust, lifetime)
After receiving the RREP packet, the source sends the
data packets following the forwarding path that established
before to the destination node.
4. SOFTWARE-DEFINED VEHICULAR AD-
HOC NETWORKS BASED ON TAODV
In this section, we present a novel architecture SD-TAODV
for data transmissions based on SDN. In the traditional
AODV protocol, flow change of transmission packets due
to the high node mobility occurs frequently [46,47]. Control
logic and forwarding logic are all located on VANET nodes.
By contrast, in our proposed SD-TAODV system, we move
the control logic of VANETs from forwarding plane to a con-
trol plane in order to improve the network performance.
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Figure 3: An example vehicular ad-hoc network us-
ing SD-TAODV mechanism.
4.1 Framework Description
The framework of SD-TAODV is similar with the tradi-
tional SDN architecture. We divide the structure of SD-
TAODV into three layers: (1) data forwarding plane oper-
ates the TAODV protocol and nodes in the plane supporting
OpenFlow protocol; (2) NOS (controller) layer aims to man-
age the network topology and establishes the data transfer
path for the data transmission; (3) application layer controls
the forwarding rules, routing tables, and routing protocols.
The whole SD-TAODV mechanism virtualizes the VANETs
and provides the services for the application layer through
the OpenFlow interfaces.
For the original OpenFlow structure as shown in Figure 1,
no matter switches or controller, they are all fixed. However,
the TAODV topology always keep changing because of the
node mobility, so the architecture of SD-TAODV should be
different from the traditional SDN.
Briefly, if a switch node receives a TAODV control packet
(T-RREQ or T-RREP), it sends the packet to the controller
to handle. If a switch node receives a data packet, it forwards
the packet to its neighbour node(s). The centralized control
mechanism in SD-TAODV manages the whole network in
the control node. So the control node first needs to know
the whole network topology.
4.2 Network Topology Discovery
The method of discovering the network topology is that
the control node sends topology request messages to its neigh-
bors. The topology request message includes the following
fields:
(PacketID, ControllerAddr, NodeTrustList, TopologyList)
The NodeTrustList is used to record the trust value of
nodes when the message has passed by a node. When any
one of nodes in the network topology receives the topology
request message, the TopologyList adds this node informa-
tion into the TopologyList field. Specifically, if a node re-
ceives the same PacketID request message, the node sends
back this packet to the controller immediately. Similarly, one
of the nodes in the network topology sends the massage back
to the controller if all of its neighbor nodes have already in
the TopologyList field. When the control node receives all
the responses, the controller can establish the whole network
topology or update the exciting topology. Figure 3 shows an
example of the SD-TAODV network topology. Road-side-
unit 1 acts as a controller in the network topology. The
method to get the whole network topology is shown below:
1) Road-side-unit 1 initializes the topology request mes-
sages (e.g, the ID is 1357), and adds them into the TopologyList.
Then road-side-unit 1 sends the request messages to its neigh-
bors, node 2 and node 3.
2) Node 2 receives the request packet and adds itself into
the TopologyList. Meanwhile, node 2 puts its own trust
value into the NodeTrustList, and node 2 broadcasts the
message to its neighbors. Due to the TopologyList already
has the information of node 1, node 2 only forwards the
topology request message to nodes 3, 4 and 5. Similarly,
node 3 only sends the request packet to its neighbor node
6. Meanwhile, node 3 sends the message back to node 2
because the PacketID is the same. Node 4 receives the re-
quest message from node 2, and node 4 puts itself into the
TopologyList. Since node 2 already exists in the TopologyList,
node 4 only transfers the message to node 6. Analogously,
node 5 also sends the request message to node 6.
3) Node 6 receives the request messages from nodes 3,
4 and 5. First node 6 puts its routing information into the
TopologyList, and adds trust value into theNodeTrustList.
Secondly, since the PacketID of three packets is the same,
node 6 sends back these three messages back to controller 1
according to the ControllerAddr.
4) When receiving all the responses from other nodes,
road-side-unit 1 gets the whole network topology.
4.3 The Working Process of the Controller
After getting the network topology, the controller can con-
trol and manage the whole network. The information inter-
action between the controller and the OpenFlow switches in-
cludes the OpenFlow messages such as OFPTF lowMod and
OFPTPacketIN . The interfaces between the controller and
OpenFlow switches are similar to the traditional southbound
API.
When receiving an OpenFlow message from a forward-
ing node, the controller determines the type of the message.
If the message is OFPTHello, the controller responds the
message and builds a connection between the node and the
controller. If the message is the OFPTPacketIN , the con-
trol node resolves the message and gets the message infor-
mation, which includes the details of the T-RREQ and T-
RREP packet. As we described before, when a T-RREQ or
T-RREP packet arrives at the control node, the controller
gets the value in PacketT rust field, and calculates the path
trust value. After finishing the packets handling, the con-
troller sends an OFPTF lowMod message to the forwarding
node.
4.4 The Working Process of the Forwarding
Node
The forwarding nodes in SD-TAODV are used to trans-
fer the data packets and control packets. The interfaces
between the control node and switches are the southbound
API, which supports OFPTHello, OFPTF lowMod and
OFPTPacketIn messages.
In SD-TAODV, the forwarding nodes send theOFPTHello
messages to the control node periodically. If any node in
the network topology receives the response from the control
node, this forwarding node builds a connection with the con-
trol node. If a forwarding node receives a control packet such
as T-RREQ packet from its neighbors, the T-RREQ packet
first matches the flow table (we assume that T-RREQ and
T-RREP cannot match the flow table). Otherwise, a for-
warding node sends this packet to the controller in order
to request a new flow table with the OFPTPacketIn mes-
sage. After resolving the packet, the control node responds
an OFPTF lowMod message back to the node and modifies
the flow table, and executes the action set in the flow table
to handle this packet.
5. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUS-
SIONS
In this section, we describe our simulation setup, configu-
rations, and simulation results. OPNET is used as the simu-
lator. In SD-TAODV simulations, we consider two different
scenarios in the route discovery process: the first one only
considers the path trust value factor, and the second one
both considers the hop count factor and path trust value.
Moreover, in our simulations, we assume that the nodes in
our TAODV are all SDN-enabled. In addition, we assume
that our SD-TAODV network includes two different types
of nodes: i) normal nodes, which the data packets are nor-
mally forwarded by those nodes; ii) malicious nodes, which
randomly drop the data packets when they receive the pack-
ets. The number of the malicious nodes is much smaller
compared with the number of normal nodes.
5.1 Simulation Setup
Our simulation model is built on the OPNET Modeler and
our model spans the area of 5× 5km2. We consider three
different situations described in Section 3. In our simulation,
the simulation parameters are as follows:
1) The simulation time is 15 mins.
2) The node density of our SD-TAODVmodel is 25 nodes.
3) The physical layer andMAC layer support IEEE 802.11.
There are three metrics evaluated in our simulations:
1) Average end-to-end delay: the average end-to-end delay
is the time calculated by the data packets to be transferred
across the whole network from the source to the destination.
It includes buffer delays during the route discovery process,
queuing delays at interface queues, retransmission delays at
MAC layers, and the propagation time from the source to
the destination [44,48].
2) Network throughput: the throughput is the total size
of packets received by the destination node at every second.
The network throughput is an important factor to evaluate
the network performance.
3) Total messages sent: the total messages sent are the
number of the routing messages sent in the entire network.
Firstly, the average end-to-end delay of the proposed SD-
TAODV scheme is evaluated through the Figure 4 and 5.
From these two figures, we can see that the end-to-end delay
of SD-TAODV is higher than that of the traditional AODV
with different data rates (1 Mbps, 2 Mbps, 5.5 Mbps and
11 Mbps). The reason why the end-to-end delay increasing
as the data rates grow is that the quality of channels be-
comes more and more bad as the node velocities grow, so
the risk probability of packet loss in the channels increases.
As the data rates grow, the packets are easier to be dropped
in the channels, so the end-to-end increasing as the data
rates grow. There are two reasons for the higher end-to-
end delay of SD-TAODV: i) in the route discover process,
the SD-TAODV nodes always select fresh and higher path
trust value routes to establish reverse and forwarding paths
in order to transfer the data packets to the destination. The
best trust value route reduces the risk probability of route
breakdown because of the drop. However, the new routes
may have more hop counts to the destination than the tradi-
tional AODV. The data packets need to spend more time to
be transferred in the new routes; and ii) for the SD-TAODV
scheme, the nodes first need to build connection with the
control node. When TAODV packets (T-RREQ, T-RREP)
arrive, nodes send the control packets to the controller to
handle. This process also need to spend some time. So com-
paring with the traditional AODV network, the end-to-end
delay of SD-TAODV is higher.
Figures 6 and 7 depict the throughput comparison of SD-
TAODV and traditional AODV in different data rates. In
Figure 6, we only consider the trust value factor. In Fig-
ure 7, we consider the trust value and hop count. Through
these two figures, we can conclude that the performance of
the proposed SD-TAODV mechanism is better than the tra-
ditional AODV protocol. These two scenarios indicates that
the network performance of SD-TAODV is better than the
traditional AODV network. As the data rates grow, we can
find that the throughput of both SD-TAODV and original
AODV all increases. This is because more data packets can
be received as the data rates grow. The reason for the better
performance of SD-AOTDV is that the best trust value path
is selected by the SD-AOTDV system, which means that the
selected path between two nodes reduces the risk of packet
loss and the quality of links are better than the traditional
AODV. In other words, as the data packets are transferred
on the secure paths, the possibilities of packets loss are lower
than the traditional AODV. So the SD-TAODV scheme has
performance improvement in terms of network throughput
compared to traditional AODV.
5.2 Evaluation
In addition, we also evaluate the SD-TAODV network per-
formance in different numbers of VANET nodes. In Fig-
ure 8, we can see that the throughput of SD-TAODV and
original AODV all decreases as the number of nodes grows.
We assume that the number of malicious nodes increases as
the number of nodes grows. The malicious nodes also have
big impact on the throughput of SD-TAODV network [49].
The network throughput decreases significantly, as shown in
Fig. 8. Although the network throughput decreases as the
number of nodes grows, the SD-TAODV network through-
put still better than the original scheme. Because network
nodes update their neighbors’ information periodically, the
control node of SD-TAODV can respond faster to the topol-
ogy change. As the network nodes leave or join the network,
the control node detects the topology change and sends the
control messages to these new nodes to maintain the data
transfer path. So our proposed scheme has performance im-
provement than the traditional AODV.
Finally, we compare the total message overhead sent in
different number of nodes. Figure 9 depicts how much mes-
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sage overhead sent by the SD-TAODV mechanism compared
with the traditional AODV protocol. Through Figure 9, we
can conclude that the message overhead of the SD-TAODV is
higher than the original AODV. This is because the nodes in
SD-TAODV network need to send extraneous messages such
as OFPTHello and OFPTPacketIn to the control node. In
Figure 9, since more nodes join the network as the number of
nodes increases, the message overhead grows simultaneously
in both AODV and SD-TAODV.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a novel framework of
software-defined VANETs with trust management. We de-
signed a routing protocol named software-defined trust based
ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (SD-TAODV).
In SD-TAODV, the route discovery and the route mainte-
nance process are moved into a controller, and the reverse
and forwarding paths are chosen by the controller. Simula-
tion results were presented to show the effectiveness of the
proposed software-defined VANETs with trust management.
We compared our SD-TAODV protocol with the traditional
AODV protocol in terms of end-to-end delay, throughput
and message overhead. Although the end-to-end delay of
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Figure 7: Average throughput comparison of SD-
TAODV with the trust value and hop count.
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Figure 8: Average throughput comparison with dif-
ferent numbers of nodes.
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Figure 9: Total message overhead comparison with
different numbers of nodes.
SD-TAODV is higher than AODV, the network throughput
performance improves significantly in SD-TAODV. In the
future, we will study to reduce the end-to-end delay of our
proposed framework.
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